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Rebellious Lawyering, Regnant Lawyering,
and Street-Level Bureaucracy
by
PAUL R.

TREMBLAY*

Introduction
The professional responsibilities of progressive lawyers are becoming less clear as we explore them more deeply. The debate about the
proper ethical stance for lawyers representing the poor and disadvantaged is important and necessary, but it has yet to yield a coherent picture of how such lawyers ought to treat clients and their disputes.
Because of the inherently political character of representing the disadvantaged, the peculiar vulnerability of those clients, and the absence of
ordinary economic constraints on the attorney-client relationship, most
would agree that the duties of progressive lawyers representing
subordinated clients are different from those of lawyers representing
more powerful clients.' The precise nature of that difference, however,
continues to perplex us.
* Assistant Clinical Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. I would like to
thank Bob Smith, Carol Liebman, and Marie Ashe for agreeing to read earlier drafts of this
work. I would also like to thank Simeon Herskovits and Apalla Chopra of the Hastings Law
Journal for their encouragement, support, and editorial wisdom.
1. Gary Bellow and Jeanne Kettleson have addressed the "distinctive characteristics" of
law practice on behalf of the "legally disadvantaged." Gary Bellow & Jeanne Kettleson, From
Ethics to Politics: Confronting Scarcity and Fairness in Public Interest Practice, 58 B.U. L.
REv. 337, 342 (1978). They attribute the distinctiveness to elements such as the following: (1)
economic incentives and disincentives are not dominant factors in the way relationships and
obligations are defined; (2) public interest lawyers have the capacity to exert considerable influence over their vulnerable clients; and (3) clients are not constrained by financial concerns in
making demands for lawyer time and services. Id at 340-41. Bellow and Kettleson's thesis
has served as the basis for much of the recent literature about the professional obligations of
public interest lawyers. Joel Handler also has explored how the dependent character of disadvantaged clients limits their effective participation in most modern bureaucratic institutions,
including law. See Joel F. Handler, Dependent People, the State, and the Modern/Postmodern
Searchfor the Dialogic Community, 35 UCLA L. REv. 999, 1019-22 (1988).
Not all authorities, however, concede that progressive lawyers ought to be bound by professional obligations different from those that bind conventional lawyers. Segments of the
practicing bar occasionally tout the similarity between the role mandates of poverty lawyers
and those of conventional lawyers. See, eg., PROJECT ADVISoRY GROUP, FUTURE CHALLENGES: A PLANNING DOCUMENT FOR LEGAL SERVICES 2 (1988) (Legal Services Corpora-
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Different "models" have been offered in an effort both to outline the
implementation of progressive practice and to craft theoretical bases for

such practice. One significant school of thought urges a "rebellious" approach to lawyering for the subordinated. 2 The rebellious view builds
upon an obligation to empower clients that largely translates into concepts of mobilization, organization, and deprofessionalization. 3 A connected but slightly different view urges more zealous attention to the
legal needs of clients, and criticizes what it perceives as superficial or
tion-funded attorneys advocacy group endorsing Congress' "underlying premise that the role
of a legal services advocate is no different than the role of any legal professional."); STANDARDS FOR PROVIDERS OF CIVIL LEGAL SERVICES TO THE POOR, Introduction at iv (Am.

Bar. Ass'n 1986) (similar sentiment). The wealth of theoretical literature, see, eg., authorities
cited infra notes 2-5, does not support this concept. While the practice organizations claim
there is no difference in professional obligations, the very fact that they have issued the documents cited above evidences a concern on their part that legal services lawyers face some different practice tensions and dilemmas than conventional lawyers.
2. The term "rebellious" was introduced by Gerald L6pez. See Gerald P. L6pez,
Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in the Life of a Rebellious Collaboration, 77
GEO. L.J. 1603, 1608 (1989) [hereinafter L6pez, Rebellious Collaboration];Gerald P. L6pez,
TrainingFuture Lawyers to Work with the Politically and Socially Subordinated: Anti-Generic
Legal Education, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 305, 379-86 (1989).
3. The "empowerment" perspective, which I refer to here as rebellious lawyering, has a
long tradition in the literature of poverty law. Significant contributions to this perspective
include Richard L. Abel, Law Without Politics: Legal Aid Under Advanced Capitalism, 32
UCLA L. REV. 474 (1985); Anthony V. Alfieri, The Antinomies of Poverty Law anda Theory
ofDialogic Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 659 (1987-88) [hereinafter
Alfieri, Antinomies]; Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative,100 YALE L.J. 2107 (1991) [hereinafter Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty
Law Practice];Anthony V. Alfieri, Speaking Out of Turn: The Story ofJosephine V., 4 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 619 (1991) [hereafter Alfieri, Speaking Out of Turn]; Steve Bachmann, Lawyers, Law, and Social Change, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1 (1984-85); Edgar S. Calm
& Jean C. Cahn, The War on Poverty: 4 Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE L.J. 1317 (1964) [hereinafter Cahn & Cahn, A Civilian Perspective]; Edgar S. Cahn & Jean C. Cahn, What Price
Justice: The Civilian PerspectiveRevisited, 41 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 927 (1966) [hereinafter
Cahn & Cahn, The Civilian PerspectiveRevisited]; Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power
and Breaking Images: CriticalLegal Theory and the Practiceof Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 369 (1982-83); Anita Hodgkiss, Petitioningand the Empowerment Theory of
Practice, 96 YALE L.J. 569 (1987); Austin Sarat, '..
The Law Is All Over": Power, Resistance, and the Legal Consciousness of the Welfare Poor, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 343 (1990);
William H. Simon, Visions ofPracticein Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 469 (1984) [hereinafter Simon, Visions Of Practice]; Stephen Wexler, PracticingLaw for Poor People, 79 YALE
L.J. 1049 (1970); Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessonsfrom Driefonteinon Lawyering
and Power, 1988 WIs. L. REV. 699; Lucie E. White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Space for Clients to Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 535 (1987-88)
[hereinafter White, Mobilization on the Margins]; Lucie E. White, Subordination,Rhetorical
SurvivalSkills, andSunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearingof Mrs G., 38 BuFF.L. REV. 1 (1990)
[hereinafter White, Sunday Shoes]; Lucie White, Goldberg v. Kelly on the Paradoxof Lawyeringfor the Poor, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 861 (1990) [hereinafter White, Paradox];Robert Borosage
et al., Comment, The New Public Interest Lawyers, 79 YALE L.J. 1069 (1970).
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mass produced legal work coming from busy poverty law offices. 4 Recently, I have proposed an ethic for legal services lawyers that seeks to
reconcile the legal needs of the client community with those of individual
clients, and that explains, while perhaps not justifying, the phenomenon
of mass produced justice for poor people.5 Each of these efforts has
struggled with the inevitable tensions between individual service and
community goals, and between the politics of legal instrumentality and

the politics of community organizing. Most arrive at a fairly critical assessment of present progressive practice.
These discussions of progressive lawyers' professional obligations
commonly tend to include relatively unflattering comments about the
6
lawyers themselves. Poverty lawyers have been described as oppressors,
as domineering, 7 as unreflective, 8 as poor lawyers, 9 or as unfeeling bureaucrats. 10 This element of the literature implies that the problem with
poverty law is at least in part a problem with poverty lawyers themselves,
and that improvement depends upon those lawyers changing their attitudes and practices.1
This Essay takes a somewhat more apologetic view of poverty lawyers. I suggest that experience teaches us that poverty lawyers are generally good, energetic lawyers committed to social justice and to lessening
the pain of poverty. No doubt there are poverty lawyers who are oppressive, paternalistic, mediocre, or unfeeling bureaucrats. This, however, is
4. See, e.g., Gary Bellow, TurningSolutions Into Problems: The Legal Aid Experience,
34 N.L.A.D.A. BRIEFCASE 106, 107 (1977); Sarat, supra note 3, at 346-47.
5. See Paul R. Tremblay, Toward a Community-Based Ethicfor Legal Services Practice,
37 UCLA L. REV. 1101, 1106 (1990) [hereinafter Tremblay, Community-Based Ethic].
6. See, e.g., Alfieri, Antinomies, supra note 3, at 661-65.
7. See, e.g., White, Paradox,supra note 3, at 861 ("Mhe advocate.., replays the drama
of subordination in her own work.").
8. See, eg., Alfieri, Speaking Out of Turn, supra note 3, at 626 (poverty lawyers' vision
of client's world is restricted, "rendering alternative stories of client autonomy and community
unthinkable").
9. See, e.g., Bellow, supra note 4, at 1341 (criticizing poor lawyering found in legal services offices); Sarat, supra note 3, at 349-51 (reporting client complaints of less than zealous
advocacy on their behalf by legal services lawyers).
10. See, e.g., JACK KATZ, POOR PEOPLE'S LAWYERS INTRANSrrON 161 (1982); Bellow,
supra note 4; Jerome E. Carlin & Jan Howard, Legal Representation and Class Justice, 12
UCLA L. REv. 381, 416-17 (1965); Carl J. Hosticka, We Don't Care About What Happened,
We Only CareAbout What is Going to Happen: Lawyer-ClientNegotiationsof Reality, 26 Soc.
PROBS. 599 (1979).
11. The citations in the previous sentence offer examples of the tendency to place responsibility on poverty lawyers for the defects in poverty lawyering. The most ardent critic of the
poverty lawyer seems to be Tony Alfieri. See Alfieri, Antinomies, supra note 3, at 665; Alfieri,
Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice,supra note 3, at 2123-25; Alfieri, Speaking Out of Turn,
supra note 3, at 625-28.
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not the problem with poverty lawyering. Rather, the defects in poverty
lawyering are structural, institutional, political, economic, and ethical.
Teaching poverty lawyers to change their attitudes may be critically important, but those attitudes and the resulting behavior are largely products of the conditions under which poverty lawyers work. Our mission
as teachers and practitioners should be to develop practice patterns and
proposals that account for the street-level experiences of those legal services lawyers who work on the front lines.
This Essay examines the notions of rebellious lawyering and "regnant" lawyering 12 as they are affected by the daily triage obligations of
legal services offices. 13 I argue that rebellious lawyering constitutes a justifiable, justice-based allocation of resources away from clients' shortterm needs and in favor of a community's long-term needs. Experience
from comparable resource allocation debates in the medical field and in
bioethics, however, reminds us of the difficulties we face in making such
distributive choices at an individual level. A generally overriding "ethic
of care" operates to hinder the efforts of individual, street-level providers
to postpone offering immediate relief in order to enhance a later, and
perhaps more effective, benefit. By contrast, what we describe, and criticize, as regnant lawyering is better seen as the tendency of care providers
to favor the present and identifiable over the future and unnamed. This
may not justify regnant lawyering-in fact, an ethical analysis would
likely conclude that short-term efforts unjustifiably work to the detriment
of the client community in the long run-but it helps to explain regnant
lawyering's persistence. We must therefore confront this apparent preference for the "rescue mission" if we are to arrive at an accepted rebellious role for poverty lawyers.
Because the rebellious view aims to defer rewards, it must rely less
upon client demand for its justification and impetus. For this reason, I
believe a significant element of the rebellious approach-the participatory, client-centered emphasis on client voice 14-may conflict with
its collectivist strain. Unless we advocate a more paternalistic or in12. The term "regnant," like the term "rebellious," is courtesy of Gerald L6pez. See
L6pez, Rebellious Collaboration,supra note 2, at 1609. It refers to lawyering for poor people
in a fashion that relies upon conventional remedies and institutions, and upon lawyer expertise
and dominance, even while seeking the client's "best interests." See infra notes 28-32 and
accompanying text.
13. It continues an inquiry I began in a recent exploration of the "tragic" side of poverty
law practice. See Paul R. Tremblay, A Tragic View of Poverty Law Practice, 1 D.C. L. REv.
(forthcoming 1992) (on file with the Hastings Law Journal)(manuscript at 16-32) [hereinafter
Tremblay, A Tragic View].
14. For a description of that theme, see infra note 24 and accompanying text.
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terventionist approach in the representation and translation of our clients' "voices"-quite plainly a non sequitur-we may have to conclude
that increased client-centeredness will lead to more, rather than less, conventional lawyering.

I. The Rebellious and Regnant Views Described
Rebellious lawyering is lawyering that seeks to empower
subordinated clients.15 Its proponents recognize that being represented
by a lawyer is seldom an experience that leaves a client feeling or being
empowered. 1 6 Most lawyers dominate lawyer-client interactions with
their expertise in technical matters, their use of mysterious legal language, their depersonalization of disputes, and their greater perceived
importance. 17 Dominance by lawyers is pervasive in our profession, but
it is especially pronounced with poor or more dependent people, and
least prominent with powerful or corporate clients.1 8 Rebellious lawyering is therefore attentive to the elements of the attorney-client relationship and its interpersonal qualities that might further disenfranchise
those who are oppressed. 19
A second element of rebellious lawyering addresses substance rather

than process. Not only is the attorney-client relationshipdisempowering
20
to clients, but the services rendered by lawyers also disempower clients.
15. This is Gerald L6pez' definition, see L6pez, Rebellious Collaboration,supra note 2, at
1608, and it is the definition that I use to encompass the several other perspectives that I refer
to as "rebellious." See supra note 3.
16. See, e.g., Gabel & Harris, supra note 3, at 407-10; Wexler, supra note 3, at 1059.
17. This observation has been made by many commentators. For examples of these arguments, see Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law, supra note 3, at 2127-30; L6pez, Rebellious
Collaboration,supra note 2, at 1608-10; Wexler, supra note 3, at 1049-50; White, Mobilization
on the Margins, supra note 3, at 540, 542-44.
18. For evidence that powerful clients exert greater control over their lawyers than poor
clients, see Robert L. Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and ProfessionalAutonomy: Social Values
and Client Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. Rav. 503, 507 (1985); Mark
Spiegel, Lawyers andProfessionalAutonomy: Reflections on CorporateLawyering and the Doctrine of Informed Consent, 9 W. NEw ENG. L. Rnv. 139, 143-44 (1987).
19. The notion of egalitarian participation is one of the most significant ideas put forward
in the effort to overcome the traditional dominance of lawyers in the attorney-client relationship. For elaboration upon this idea, see, e.g., Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice,
supra note 3, at 2134-45; L6pez, Rebellious Collaboration,supra note 2, at 1608; Simon, Visions of Practice,supra note 3, at 486. William Simon describes this phenomenon as follows:
The precept that the lawyer further the client's interests, as she understands them, is
qualified by the precept that she also try to enhance the client's capacity to express
her own interests. The authoritative test of the lawyer's judgment is that the client
come to share it under conditions in which the lawyer believes that the client's understanding is not affected by conditions of hierarchy.
Simon, Visions of Practice,supra note 3, at 486.
20. See, eg., Abel, supra note 3, at 578-79, 595-97; Alfieri, Antinomies, supra note 3, at
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Lawyers are socialized to view disputes in the context of law, to perceive
disputes as cases, and to cast persons in roles such as plaintiffs, defendants, or "deep pockets." Lawyers see clients as persons to be helped, as
powerless persons who need to have problems solved through the intervention of the lawyer and her skills. Even if the result of such intervention were good for the client's material existence, that gain might come at
the expense of the client's sense of control over her life, her self-esteem,
her power.21 The rebellious perspective, though, also questions whether
the lawyer's intervention is in fact good for the client's material existence. 22 Formal legal intervention may bring short-term benefits such as a
successful lawsuit, administrative appeal, or beneficial settlement. Little
long-term benefit, however, may result from legal intervention, because
the oppressive, unfair, or even unlawful conditions which led to the dispute do not change. Long-term rewards are not only ignored, they are
23
sacrificed, as energies are applied elsewhere, and thus lost.
The rebellious idea of lawyering for the subordinated seeks to address the three defects in conventional lawyering just described: the interpersonal domination of clients by lawyers; the disempowerment that
accompanies reliance on litigation-based dispute resolution or its
equivalent; and the inefficacy of intrasystemic remedies to achieve meaningful change in the lives of poor clients. It first proposes a restructuring
of the attorney-client relationship. By increasing participation and collaboration between client and lawyer the rebellious idea of lawyering attempts to overcome the oppressive character of most law office
interactions. 24 I shall refer to this as the "client voice" theme of rebellious lawyering. It then de-emphasizes conventional lawyering remedies
665; Phillip M. Lord & Patricia L. Smith, The New Black Lawyer as Community Builder, 7
BLACK L.J. 62, 64-65 (1981).
21. See, eg., Alfieri, Speaking Out of Turn, supranote 3, at 631-33; White, Sunday Shoes,
supra note 3, at 49.
22. Much of the critical literature challenges the underlying assumption of conventional
poverty lawyering that clients benefit from the usual activities that lawyers perform for their
clients. See, eg., Richard L. Abel, Socializing the Legal Profession: Can Redistributing Lawyers' Services Achieve SocialJustice?, 1 LAW & POL'Y Q. 5, 13-15 (1979); Marc Galanter, My
the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc.
REv. 95, 151 (1974); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Law Reforming in the Anti-Poverty Effort, 37 U.
CHI. L. RFv. 242, 248-55 (1970); Wexler, supra note 3, at 1053.
23. See, eg., Abel, supra note 3, at 497 (the "inescapable conclusionol ... [is] that the
offer of legal assistance actually may undermine collective action"); Alfieri, Antinomies, supra
note 3, at 688. Alfieri relies upon the theories of Antonio Gramsci for the position that hegemony operates to leave its subjects believing that there is no other way of viewing the world
except through existing norms and institutions. Id. at 678-79. For a similar reliance upon
Gramsci, see JOEL F. HANDLER, LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR COMMUNITY 24 (1990).
24. See, e.g., L6pez, Rebellious Collaboration,supra note 2, at 1615-16; White, Sunday
Shoes, supra note 3, at 52-53.
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to minimize the second and third problems. It urges a collective response
to the issues faced by poor clients. 2 5 A rebellious lawyer will encourage
clients to organize, to connect, and to work for power and change extrasystemically as well as intrasystemically. 26 I will refer to this as the
"collectivist" theme of the rebellious view. As I discuss below, there is
some tension between the "client voice" and the "collectivist" themes. 27
Regnant lawyering is not necessarily all lawyering that is not rebellious. As employed by Gerald L6pez, the term describes that strain of
legal activity characteristic of liberal and progressive lawyers who care
about social justice, but who are too enmeshed in their law oriented environment to perceive its limitations and harms. 28 Regnant lawyering is
client-centered, but in an instrumental way; it seeks to improve the lot of
the disadvantaged by increasing their access to rights and to institutionally defined remedies. It can include empathic and client-centered lawyering on behalf of individual poor clients,2 9 or thoughtful impact
litigation on behalf of a class of poor persons. 30 Indeed, regnant lawyering may be perversely dangerous precisely because it is benign and wellintentioned. 31 Its impact upon dependent clients is harder to resist because the subordination happens in a supportive and caring context, and
the perpetrator of the subordination is one who the client views as a
helper or a champion. Not only may clients be misled about the efficacy
of the work performed on their behalf, but regnant lawyers themselves
are apt to misunderstand the effects of their work. Well-intended public
interest lawyers litigating important lawsuits may well have no reason to
suspect that their efforts are anything but "good" for their clients. A
significant contribution of the rebellious literature is its insight for prac25. See, e.g., Alfieri, Antinomies, supra note 3, at 699-711; Bachmann, supra note 3, at 6,
21-29; L6pez, Rebellious Collaboration,supra note 2, at 1609.
26. See, eg., Simon, Visions of Practice,supra note 3, at 491-93 (comparing intrasystemic
and extrasystemic remedies).
27. See infra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
28. See L6pez, Rebellious Collaboration,supra note 2, at 1610.
29. See id For a theoretical justification of client-centered lawyering which is "progressive" in a regnant sense, see Marcy Strauss, Toward A Revised Model of Attorney-Client Rela-

tionship: The Argument for Autonomy, 65 N.C. L. REv. 315 (1987). For a critique of the
underpinnings of client-centeredness, see Anthony V. Alfieri, The Politics of Clinical Knowl-

edge, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 7, 14-19 (1990); Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-CenteredCounseling: Reappraisaland Refinement, 32 ARIz. L. Rav. 502 (1990); William H. Simon, Homo
Psychologicus: Notes on a New Legal Formalism, 32 STAN. L. Rav. 487 (1980).
30. See, eg., Marie A. Failinger & Larry May, LitigatingAgainst Poverty: Legal Services

and Group Representation, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 2-6 (1984).
31. Lucie White describes with some eloquence the unintended effects that a well-meaning, but regnant, lawyer might have on her client. See White, Sunday Shoes, supra note 3, at
45-46.
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ticing lawyers into the subtly counterproductive impact of their tradi32
tional activity.

H. Rebellious Lawyering, Macroalocation, amd the Rescue
Mission
A. The "Deferral Thesis": Rebellious Lawyering as a Future-Oriented
Undertaking
In this Section, I assess the rebellious stance's potential to serve as a
meaningful prescription for poverty lawyers. The rebellious literature is
clear and emphatic in its belief that poverty lawyers are not sufficiently
rebellious in their practices; the literature is one of exhortation and advocacy for this point of view. That exhortation, however, must confront
two separate matters. The first is whether its predictions are accurate
and reliable: will rebellious lawyering produce the empowering changes
its adherents claim? The second is a more complex ethical inquiry: who
benefits from this new lawyering? Is it present clients presently, present
clients in the future, future clients, or unempowered persons generally?
The attractiveness, and thus the implementation, of the rebellious view
will differ based on how one views these two matters.
For purposes of this Essay I assume that the first matter has been
established to our satisfaction. The arguments offered for rebelliousness,
as described in the prior Section, certainly make sense, and there is significant historical evidence of the effectiveness of mobilizing for the purpose of achieving meaningful political change. 33 Stories offered by recent
writers 34 show the success of efforts to address poor persons' issues col32. Gerald L6pez' critique of the lawyering performed by his fictional civil rights lawyer,
Martha Fisher, serves as a powerful example of this point. See L6pez, Rebellious Collaboration, supra note 2, at 1656-57. In the absence of L6pez' trenchant analysis, Fisher's lawyering
appears brilliant and thorough; L6pez concedes both of those descriptions but demonstrates
how "brilliant and thorough" lawyering may at the same time be disempowering and counterproductive. Lucie White's story of Mrs. G.'s lawyer is similarly striking. See White, Sunday
Shoes, supra note 3, at 19-58. White captures an everyday, almost commonplace, event for any
practicing legal services lawyer and exposes the complexity and ambivalence of the client's
experience of that interaction.
33. See, e.g., MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE 267 (1986) (arguing that most extensions of government assistance to the poor have resulted from the militant protest of poor people themselves); FRANCES FOX PreEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD,
POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY SUCCEED, How THEY FAIL 265, 271-75 (1977)

(same).
34. I am thinking especially of Gary Bellow, Lucie White, Peter Gabel and Paul Harris,
Steve Bachmann, and Gerald L6pez. See, e.g., PHILIP B. HEYMANN & LANCE LIEBMAN, THE
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILMES OF LAWYERS: CASE STUDIES 22-48 (1988) (account of Gary Bellow's experiences at California Rural Legal Assistance in mobilizing farmworkers); Gabel &
Harris, supra note 3, at 380-94 (describing both "political" trials and more mundane disputes
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lectively and militantly, supporting the efficacy of a more political practice. Though the results of studies seeking empirical, or quantitative,
confirmation of this thesis are best described as mixed 35 and many questions remain to be explored,3 6 I assume, for present purposes, that the
normative predictions of rebellious lawyering are solid. The questions I
explore more deeply here rest on that assumption and arise from its
premises.
If a more political practice is effective, then the question becomes for
whom is it effective? I argue that a rebellious practice generally defers
present benefits in return for promises of long-term reward. I will refer
to this argument as the "deferral thesis." This premise is critical to my
discussion below; if I am wrong about this, most of what I have to say
will be of little interest to the ethical assessment of the rebellious stance.
But I think the premise is correct. I cannot claim that the literature is
abundantly clear on this point, nor can I claim that the deferral thesis is
always true. In fact, there are many instances in which we see immediate
rewards from the more political practice. A rent strike, for example,
might prove to be a far more effective device than a traditional lawsuit
with an activist eye); L6pez, Rebellious Collaboration,supra note 2; Borosage et al., supra note
3, at 1086-88 (describing Bellow's farmworker experience).
35. Social scientists have apparently tried to test the assertions of writers such as Piven
and Cloward that welfare benefits increased as a result of militancy and mobilization among
those who sought eligibility. Compare Robert B. Albritton, SocialAmelioration Through Mass
Insurgency? A Reexamination of the Piven and Cloward Thesis, 73 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1003,
1003.04 (1979) (evidence does not support the mobilization efficacy claim), and Eugene
Durman, Have the Poor Been Regulated? Toward a Multivariate Understanding of Welfare
Growth, 47 Soc. SERv. REV. 339, 341-46 (1973) (same), with Larry Isaac & William R. Kelly,
Racial Insurgency, the State, and Welfare Expansion, 86 AM. J. Soc. 1348, 1360-75 (1981)
(employing quantitative evidence to support the Piven and Cloward thesis); Sanford F. Schram
& J. Patrick Turbett, Civil Disorderand the Welfare Explosion: A Two-Step Process, 48 AM.
Soc. REv. 408, 410-13 (1983) (same). Michael Katz has argued that both sets of studies are
flawed in their perspectives and methods, and that "the Piven and Cloward thesis ... can only
be tested through individual, historical case studies that try to find out not only what happened
but why it happened." KATZ, supra note 33, at 321 n.32.
36. Several important questions need to be answered satisfactorily if the rebellious view is
to remain a persuasive theory. For instance, can mobilization by activists alter the living conditions of the poor in the absence of fundamental change in capitalist economic and social
structures? See Abel, supra note 3, at 607, 619-20. If the answer to that question is no, then
the political tasks of lawyers are more far reaching and, one might comfortably predict, less
likely to engage many otherwise sympathetic attorneys. Even if the answer to the question is
yes, other questions remain about the effectiveness of lawyers as agents of mobilization. Questions about lawyer expertise and client distrust and about the ease of inducing participation on
the part of the poor also will continue to need reflection. On the latter concern, see CAROLE
PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 48 (1970); DAVID WAGNER, THE
QUEST FOR A RADICAL PROFESSION 195-210 (1990) (reporting discouragement among radical
social workers in their efforts to adopt empowerment theories at the "retail level" with individual clients).
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for the establishment of tenants' rights against an oppressive landlord.
Rebellious practices by lawyers or their clients in the courtroom or other
traditional forums might prove to be powerful measures with which to
pressure a judge or hearing officer.37 Mobilization of clients and community members might prove to be effective in establishing welfare benefits 38
or in obtaining municipal services. 39 I think, however, that these examples are the exception. I believe the reason why the rebellious stance has
not been adopted by practicing poverty lawyers is that it does not offer
short-term relief. Whether rejection of the stance because of its ineffectiveness as a short-term panacea may be ethically justified is the larger
question, to which I will turn in Part II. But first I will explain the
deferral thesis more fully.
At one level the argument that rebellious lawyering is future oriented is rather self-evident. To a large extent the justification offered for
adopting a more political and collectivist practice stance is that the deferral of temporary (and perhaps illusory) benefits ultimately will result in
gaining more substantial, meaningful benefits. This argument echoes the
normative vision invoked to justify legal services offices focusing on impact litigation at the expense of individual service cases.40 Though the
justification for impact work stresses efficiency,4 1 that value usually favors the long view over the short view, particularly when more clients
will be benefitted overall by sacrificing service needs for impact goals. 42
Similarly, the writing about empowerment readily accepts a gradual increase in power for dependent or subordinated persons as a worthwhile
43
replacement for the kind of benefits ordinary lawyering might bring.
37. See Alfieri, Speaking Out of Turn, supra note 3, at 641-43 (client opted for unconventional speaking out at an administrative hearing); Gabel & Harris, supra note 3, at 399-410
(courtroom tactics); White Sunday Shoes, supra note 3, at 30-32 (client opted for unconventional speaking out at an administrative hearing); Borosage et al., supra note 3, at 1088 (deposition tactics).
38. See PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 33, at 275-85 (discussing the advantages and
disadvantages of mobilization in the context of developing strategies for obtaining AFDC benefits in the late 1960s).
39. See infra note 47 (stop sign example).
40. For a glimpse of the arguments justifying impact work, even when doing that work
means turning away eligible and needy individual clients, see DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND
JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 295, 306-10 (1988); Bellow & Kettleson, supra note 1, at 34344, 353-54.
41. See, eg., LUBAN, supra note 40, at 317-40.
42. See, e.g., Failinger & May, supra note 30, at 27-28; Stephen Wizner, Homelessness:
Advocacy and Social Policy, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 387, 404-05 (1990-91) (struggling with the
tension between responding to the immediate needs of the homeless and pursuing long-term
changes that might prevent homelessness).
43. It deserves note, though, that the argument in favor of impact litigation is not at all
congruent with the arguments for the rebellious view, for the former is classically regnant.
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If the deferral premise were this straightforward, I could now turn
to the complications caused by the sacrifices that the rebellious stance
asks clients to make. But I read the empowerment literature as leaving
the question of who rebellious lawyering will benefit unanswered. I
therefore present a brief argument to persuade the reader that the rebellious view privileges the long perspective, which may, perhaps, be contrary to the claims of some of the writings about it.44 Part of the
difficulty I encounter is in separating the two strands of empowerment
46
theoretics-the "collectivist" theme45 and the "client voice" theme.
The collectivist argument values mobilization. Some writers appear to

contend that mobilization is preferable to litigation, even for the immediate client. Steve Bachmann's ACORN story of a client seeking to obtain
a stop sign on her street is such an example. 47 Gary Bellow's Tulare
County deposition story4 8 is a less simple but powerful example of political rebellious lawyering that benefits clients in the same way that effective litigation would, while also empowering them and altering their

political consciousness. Other rebelliousness advocates imply that mobilization is an effective method for clients to redress their grievances. 49
See, ag., HEYMANN & LIEBMAN, supra note 34, at 24-27 (reporting Gary Bellow's objection to
impact lawyering).
44. The writers discussed at note 37, supra, and notes 47-49, infra for instance, are examples of implied claims that rebellious practice will aid present clients.
45. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
46. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
47. Bachmann, supra note 3, at 6. Bachmann tells us that the client who needs a stop
sign installed on a local street comer might obtain that sign by getting a lawyer to file a lawsuit. But the client would not know, understand, or feel a part of the process that led to the
sign appearing. Bachmann's organization, ACORN, suggests that community members instead organize, hold a demonstration, and put pressure on local officials until they succeed in
obtaining the sign. "From this experience, people in the neighborhood would learn that they
can have power if they organize, and coordinate their efforts." itd
48. See Borosage et al., supra note 3, at 1088. This Comment describes Gary Bellow's
litigation tactic while representing farm workers in Tulare County as a lawyer at California
Rural Legal Assistance. Bellow chose to conduct the deposition of the head of the farm labor
camp at a location that permitted the tenants to observe the proceedings. The experience of
watching the powerful administrator forced to answer questions and to divulge information to
their lawyer was, according to Bellow, inspiring and empowering for the clients. It brought
them closer to the struggle than they would have been had the deposition taken place in some
law firm office. Bellow's belief is that his tactic aided in the tenants' gaining significant concessions from the camp. For further discussion of this example, see Simon, Visions of Practice,
supra note 3, at 482-83.
49. See, eg., Alfieri, Antinomies, supra note 3, at 703-10 (arguing that clients should be
educated to redress grievances collectively, implying that it is in those clients' best immediate
interests to obtain vindication in that way, rather than through lawyer driven litigation); Wexler, supra note 3, at 1064-66 (offering an example of a welfare rights organization using effec-
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I think that mobilization cannot be expected consistently to play the
same kind of immediate, short-term role that more traditional litigation
and administrative hearing remedies currently play. I believe that, if
pressed, rebelliousness advocates would agree that the most important
function of mobilization is the creation of political influence that impacts
upon the ability of community members to control bureaucracy-even in
the absence of professional assistance.50 If mobilization has already occurred, the organized group may well be in a position to effect change, or
to exert influence, in as direct a way as more traditional (for example,
legal) avenues may provide. If mobilization has not yet occurred, the
rebellious view urges lawyers to spur collective activity. But this process
will take energy, resources, expertise, and time. Unless the poverty lawyer is expected to do both at the same time, the mobilization effort vAll
occur at the expense of other benefits the clients might wish to obtain
through conventional means. Doing both at the same time is, of course,
out of the question, because reliance upon the conventional remedy
usurps the power of mobilization 5 1 and because poverty lawyers do not
52
have the time to do both.
The discussion in the following Sections about how lawyers ought to
reconcile the rebellious long view with the immediate pain of clients will
rely largely upon the collectivist theme within the rebellious view. Does
the other theme of that view, which I have called the "voice" theme, also
privilege the long view? I think it does, but in a less clear fashion.
Recall that the "client voice" theme challenges paternalistic, lawyerdriven handling of client cases and urges increased client collaboration in
five pressure tactics to force a welfare bureaucracy to issue benefits to a client, and later to
persuade a medical facility to offer medical care it would not otherwise offer).
For an intriguing argument about empowerment schemes for dependent persons dealing
with bureaucracies that is aimed clearly at present rather than deferred changes, see HANDLER, supra note 23, at 132-42.

50. The goal of less reliance upon lawyers is prominent in the empowerment literature.
See, eg., Alfieri, Antinomies, supra note 3, at 665; Bachmann, supra note 3, at 36-44; L6pez,
Rebellious Collaboration,supra note 2, at 1605; Wexler, supra note 3, at 1053.
51. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. Most adherents of the rebellious view
believe that reliance upon conventional institutions confirms the status quo and prevents the

development of the "critical consciousness" which is essential to true and effective mobilization. See, eg., Abel, supra note 3, at 578-79 (litigation undermines mobilization); Alfieri, An-

tinomies, supra note 3, at 666-78; Bachmann, supra note 3, at 21-22, 46-47. Lucie Vchite, in
her concept of "parallel spaces," and Gerald L6pez, in his description of a civil rights dispute,

appear more open to the prospect of concurrent intrasystemic and extrasystemic activity. See
White, Mobilization on the Margins,supra note 3, at 538, 545-46; L6pez, Rebellious Collaboration, supra note 2, at 1712-13.
52. See Tremblay, Community-Based Ethic, supra note 5, at 1110, 1134.
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and control of the activity surrounding the client's dispute.5 3 Greater
deference to client expertise, and less to lawyer expertise, is likely to empower the client. The concern that arises in this context is once again
one of deferred or sacrificed rewards. I have argued that rebellious writers have overlooked the risk clients incur in rejecting technical lawyer
expertise. 4 That risk may be worth taking, but the literature has not
explicitly framed the matter as one of informed consent. To the extent
that the rebellious view privileges the empowerment of clients over their
chances of success in the immediate controversy, that stance must also be
viewed as one which favors long-term power development over short55
term instrumental gain.
B.

Justice Theory and the Rescue Mission

If we accept the deferral thesis as generally descriptive of the future
oriented character of rebellious lawyering, we then confront an ethics
debate that the medical field has engaged in for many years-the debate
about whether and how a profession (or a society) can accommodate
present needs and interests as well as the claims of future or long-term
56
needs and interests. The theorizing that has occurred in bioethics
about this topic leads us to realize three things. First, it is important that
future interests be accounted for in present decisionmaking. Second, it is
difficult to devise a scheme that protects future interests and yet is clientcentered. We can fairly expect that existing clients, and particularly clients in crisis, will not find it easy to forego immediate benefits, especially
if they are not the obvious or reasonably assured beneficiaries of the future returns. Therefore, client-driven decisions must be replaced with
decisions coming from another source, perhaps from lawyers acting as
trustees for future clients or the client community. This conclusion has
sobering consequences for the "client voice" theme. Finally, it is equally
troublesome to expect immediate care providers to develop and implement allocational schemes that sacrifice present interests in favor of future interests.
Each of these three conclusions deserves further explanation and
elaboration. All of these concerns can be framed in terms of considera53. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
54. See Tremblay, A Tragic View, supra note 13 (manuscript at 19-24).
55. d
56. For a sampling of some prominent contributions within the field of bioethics on distributive justice, see DANIEL CALLAHAN, SETING LIMrrs: MEDICAL GOALS IN AN AGING

SOCIETY (1987); NORMAN DANIELS, AM I MY PARENTS' KEEPER? (1988); JUSTICE AND
HEALTH CARE (Earl Shelp ed., 1981); DAVID MECHANIC, FROM ADVOCACY TO ALLOCATION: THE EVOLVING AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (1986).
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tions of distributive justice. Distributive justice questions regularly receive substantial attention within medicine.5 7 By contrast, distributive
justice questions in law are far less prominent. 58 The reasons and justifications for that difference are beyond the scope of this Essay, 59 but it is
57. The literature within the field of bioethics on justice and allocation of scarce resources
is voluminous. While there has been "a veritable explosion of literature on bioethical issues"
in recent years, "the preoccupation with the just allocation of resources is 'perhaps the dominant theme of bioethics today.'" Ren6e C. Fox, The Evolution ofAmerican Bioethics: A Sociological Perspective, in SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES ON MEDICAL ETHICS 201, 203, 206
(George Weisz ed., 1990) (quoting 9 LEROY WALTERS, BIBLIOGRAPHY OF BIOETHIcS 3

(1983)). See Willard Gaylin, Introduction: Autonomy, Paternalism and Community, HASREP., Oct. 5, 1984, at 5.
58. The issue ofjustice does receive a fair amount of attention within legal scholarship, of
course, but typically in the guise of two inquiries that are different from the questions of distributive justice addressed here. These inquiries are: (1) how fair and reliable is the "system of
TINGS CENTER

justice" for deciding cases, see, eg., STEPHAN LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO ADJUDICATION (1988); JOHN A. ROBERTSON, ROUGH
JUSTICE: PERSPECTIVES ON LONVER CRIMINAL COURTS 245-344 (1974); Randy E. Barnett,

Foreworc Can Justice and the Rule of Law Be Reconciled?, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 597
(1988); Mark H. Lazerson, In the Halls of Justice, the Only Justice is in the Halls, in THE
POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE 119, 119 (Richard L. Abel ed., 1982); and (2) how does the

lawyer reconcile her zealous advocacy obligations to her clients with her preprofessional moral
obligations to others affected by her lawyering tasks, see, eg., THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLE, AND LAVYERS' ETHICS (David Luban ed., 1983). There is also some focus on

the question of whether the profession is allocating adequate resources to legal services for the
poor, see, eg., Esther F. Lardent, Mandatory ProBono in Civil Cases: The Wrong Answer to
the Right Question, 49 MD. L. REv. 78 (1990); H. Harold Levinson, Making Society's Legal
System Accessible to Society: The Lawyer's Role and its Implications, 41 VAND. L. REV. 789
(1988); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to
Protect One's Rights--Part , 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153; Michael Millemann, MandatoryPro Bono
in Civil Cases: A PartialAnswer to the Right Question, 49 MD. L. REv. 18 (1990), but without
a direct challenge to any decisionmaking or macroallocation scheme that favors one population group over another. For one of the few explorations of the theme of distributive justice
between competing groups within law, see LUBAN, supra note 40, at 341-57.
59. I suspect that among the explanations for the difference in attention are the facts that:
the resources expended within medicine are far more visibly controlled by governmental insurance programs and regulation; medical costs are so prominently becoming a burden both to
families and to the economy as a whole; and all individuals regularly face health care concerns
in ways that are more unavoidable than the legal concerns people are apt to confront.
That health care is viewed as more of a right than legal care also makes the cost of its
provision a more pressing concern. While both have been claimed as or argued to be a "right,"
see, eg., Morton Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A. J. 499 (1960) (health care as a
right); William T. Blackstone, On Health Care as a Legal Right: An Exploration ofLegal and
Moral Grounds, 10 GA. L. REv. 391 (1976) (discussing constitutional, moral, and human
rights grounds for making health care a right); Marshall J. Breger, Legal Aidfor the Poor: A
Conceptual Analysis, 60 N.C. L. REv. 282, 286-97 (1982) (right to counsel for poor persons);
Norman Daniels, Health Care Needs andDistributiveJustice, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN MODERN

MEDICINE (John Arras & Nancy Rhoden eds., 3d ed. 1989) (bioethicist's argument for health
care as a limited right); Failinger & May, supra note 30, at 7-13 (right to counsel for poor
persons); Ken Karas, Recognizing a Right to Counselfor Indigent Tenants in Eviction Proceedings in New York, 24 CoLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 527, 538-53 (1991) (constructing constitu-
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important to note that the resource allocation questions with which
medicine struggles are much more unavoidable in the context of poverty
law than in the area of private lawyering. The relatively and visibly finite
resources available to address the vast array of legal problems facing individuals who cannot pay for legal services6Orequires that allocation decisions be made all the time, even if the decisionmakers do not realize
61
that they are doing so.

tional argument for court appointed counsel in certain civil proceedings); Stephen L. Pepper,
The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role A Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities,1986 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 613, 617 (access to the law is a necessary element of first class citizenship, and
access to a lawyer is a precondition to access to the law); Roy G. Spece, Jr., Preservingthe
Right to Treatment" A CriticalAssessment and Constructive Development of Constitutional
Right to Treatment Theories, 20 ARIz. L. REv. 1 (1978) (right to treatment in civil commitment context), in fact neither has been established as an enforceable "legal" right. See, e.g.,
Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981) (no right to counsel in civil
termination of parental rights proceeding); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573 (1975)
(declining to establish "right to treatment" even for those who are involuntarily institutionalized by a state), vacating and remanding493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974); Failinger & May, supra
note 30, at 10-11 (discussion of Lassiter).
In spite of this apparent comparability, it nevertheless appears that the right to be treated
when one is ill has greater support, and is more compelling within our society, than the right to
have a "free" lawyer when one is in legal difficulty. For example, most hospitals have an
obligation not to turn away persons from an emergency room, whether or not they are able to
pay, if doing so would cause serious harm. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1988) (federal statute
prohibiting Medicare-participating hospitals from refusing to treat persons in a medical emergency or in active labor); Karen I. Trieger, PreventingPatientDumping: Sharpening COBRA's
Fangs, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1186, 1204-21 (1986) (discussing the federal statute's passage).
Lawyers, on the other hand, have successfully resisted efforts to subject them to compulsory
service without pay. See, e.g., Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 301-08
(1989) (federal statute authorizing judiciary to "request an attorney to represent" indigents
does not grant power to compel such representation).
60. I understand that rebellious lawyering does not concern only those who cannot pay
for services. Especially as described by Gerald L6pez, rebellious lawyering concerns representation of the subordinated, which of course can mean ethnic and racial minorities who may not
be poor, or at least not poor enough to qualify for free legal services. See generally L6pez,
Rebellious Collaboration,supra note 2 (using the example of a Mexican small business owner
to demonstrate how the idea of rebellious lawyering might be applied by an attorney who
charges for her services). I do not disagree with Gerald L6pez on this point. I do think,
however, that the tension between future oriented practice and present needs will inevitably
arise in subsidized practice. Not only is subsidized practice the prime paradigm of lawyering
for the subordinated, but in cases in which clients pay for their legal services it is hard to
imagine the kind of sacrificing conduct rebelliousness contemplates. Because I see a more
political lawyering occurring without broad support from existing clients in crisis, I think that
stance can be implemented more readily in a subsidized practice setting than in a private-pay
setting.
61. Some might argue that all lawyers face identical distributive justice and resource allocation questions, and that the real difference between private lawyers and subsidized lawyers is
that the latter's decision not to provide representation is likely to have far more grave consequences for the rejected client. While that position is defensible on a conceptual level, I think
it misses a fundamental difference between the two classes of lawyers. Poverty lawyers (and
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Matters of distributive justice often are viewed from three perspectives. Macroallocationquestions concern broad societal or governmental
decisions about how much ought to be allocated to competing arenas,
such as legal matters versus health care, welfare versus defense, and so

forth. 62 Determining the size of the Legal Services Corporation (LSC)
budget, for instance, would be a macroallocation matter. Mesoallocation
questions concern how to distribute the allocated resources-for instance, how the LSC budget is distributed among various programs, applicants, and uses. 63 Microallocation decisions reach the street level or
here I refer primarily to legal services lawyers, see supra note 60) must operate within afixed,
identifiable, and limited pool of resources. They also own a virtual, if not literal, monopoly on
the services they offer to the qualifying public. Each decision such lawyers make about resource allocation has an impact on other clients waiting to be served. They therefore face
distributive justice choices directly, and inevitably. The funding for programs such as the LSC
appropriation process also partakes of macroallocation decisionmaking.
Private lawyers, on the other hand, particularly the vast majority who do not rely on
insurance for financial support, face none of these direct choices. Funding of private legal
services occurs on an ad hoe, individual basis, over which the lawyers have little control.
Although it is true that, viewed in the broadest scale, the far superior availability of legal
services to the wealthy, paying market constitutes a distributive justice event worthy of significant attention and criticism, it is difficult to argue that private lawyers themselves, or any
superstructure of their organizations, are engaged in the distributive activity about which I am
writing here.
In the medical profession, individual private doctors are much more apt to find themselves in the position of making resource allocation decisions than are private lawyers. One
reason for this is that funding for medical services is capped, if in an uneven and perhaps
ineffective way, by the presence of insurance carriers whose resources are limited and identifiable. A second reason is that some medical services are not unlimited and are not fungible.
Heart transplants and dialysis machines are options that a given medical facility may be unable
to offer to all who desire or need them. Lawyers' services, on the other hand, are quite fungible, and are limited only by the available time of the lawyers in the local community.
For elaboration of how the scarcity of resources affects poverty lawyers, see Tremblay,
Community-Based Ethic, supra note 5. For support for the argument that all lawyers do implicitly make distributive justice decisions in their daily activity, see William H. Simon, Ethical
Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARv. L. Rnv. 1083, 1093-94 (1988).
62. See, e.g., TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS 283-290 (3d ed. 1989); RAANON GILLON, PHILOSOPHICAL MEDICAL ETHICS 93

(1986).
63. GILLON, supra note 62, at 93. Raanon Gillon employs the term "mesoallocation" to
refer to decisions that many other ethicists refer to as part of the macroallocation domain. See,
e.g., BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 62, at 287; H. TRISTRAM ENGLEHARDT, JR., THE

FOUNDATIONS OF BIOETHICs 344-48 (1986) (Englehardt refers to four perspectives: higherlevel macroallocation; lower-level macroallocation; higher-level microallocation; and lowerlevel microallocation, to capture the macro, meso, and micro distinctions). The mesoallocation term is helpful to the present discussion of legal services because the issues that lawyers
are asked to confront arise after legislative appropriation has occurred, and, as will become
clear, there is a complex tension between mesoallocation roles and microallocation responsibilities. See infra notes 72-80 and accompanying text.
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the bedside: how an individual provider distributes the available resources among her various present and potential clients or patients."
The vision of rebellious lawyering described above represents a bundle of mesoallocation and microallocation recommendations that have as
their purpose the introduction of future oriented values into the lawyering scheme. 65 The future benefit versus present benefit tension that the
rebellious view presents is prominent in medicine as well, and has received much attention from bioethicists. The most evident parallel example in medicine is the choice whether to allocate resources to
preventive medicine or to crisis, or "rescue," medicine. 66 The debate

about that choice is instructive for those of us seeking a fair and ethical

67
justification for rebellious lawyering.
How can medicine justify spending funds for preventive measures

when many have ongoing acute needs that cannot be met? Several justice
related concepts may be offered in support of that choice. A prominent
justification is efficieney. 68 If available evidence shows that more individuals may be made healthy by preventive means than by rescue measures,
a mesoallocation policy favoring prevention garners support. There are
weaknesses to this efficiency argument, however, notably the questionable nature of its utilitarian basis. 69 Another justification is a Rawlsian
"social contract" theory of justice, which factors the needs of future generations into present decisionmaking. 70 Ronald Green points out that

Rawls begins by assuming "rational voters in a hypothetical contract situation," each of whom is ignorant of who she is and how she is affected
by the proposed policy, and thus engages us in a moral conversation that
64. GILLON, supra note 62, at 94.
65. It is fair to say that meso and microallocation decisions are more difficult to confront
than macroallocation choices, if only because the winners and losers are more immediate.
66. See, eg., BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 62, at 287-88; James F. Childress,
Prioritiesin the Allocation of Health Care Resources, in JUSTICE AND HEALTH CARE, supra
note 56, at 139, 141-47.
67. While I see the prevention/rescue tension as parallel to the long-term/short-term
tension pressed by the rebellions literature, it is apparent that the same tension exists within
regnant circles. See, e.g., Wizner, supra note 42, at 404-05 (preventive measures for homelessness versus seeking immediate shelters). For a view that compares the prevention/rescue tension in a form that borrows from both regnant and rebellious camps, see Lucie E. White,
Representing "The Real Deal," 45 U. MIAMI L. REv. 271, 292-95 (1990-91).
68. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 62, at 288; Childress, supra note 66, at
142.
69. See, e.g., Ronald M. Green, Justiceand the Claims of Future Generations,in JusTIcE
AND HEALTH CARE, supra note 56, at 193-97 (pointing out certain "bizarre implications" of a
purely utilitarian approach of "the greatest happiness for the greatest number," including its
obvious weight in favor of the "others"-there will always be more of them-and the implicit
accompanying moral obligation to "produce more persons to experience happiness").
70. Id.; JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11-17 (1971).
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must include others who may not yet be born.7 1 Practices which maximize present gain at the expense of future individuals become morally
troublesome when viewed from this perspective.
It is not surprising to find justice-based justifications for a futureoriented public policy. At the level of theory, the argument that it is
morally correct to consider the harm caused to others by giving attention
to certain individuals has a logical, as well as a prudential, 72 attractiveness. This attractiveness supports in large measure the force of the rebellious view. These arguments echo those made by David Luban in his
justification of focused case pressure in legal services 73 and of lawyer activism in class action contexts. 74 But rescue medicine has its moral defenders, and an assessment of rebellious lawyering must confront the
ethical imperatives that favor clients in the here-and-now.
A large part of rescue medicine's defense appears to be visceral in
nature. The bioethicist Edmund Pellegrino writes, "[T]here is an inescapable immediacy about the call for help of a sick person that overshad75
ows all other more remote social needs, no matter how important."
James Childress reports that "[o]ur society often favors rescue or crisis
intervention over prevention because of our putative preference for
known, identified lives over statistical lives."' 76 But Childress and others
also have attempted a more principled justification of the immediacy concern, one that builds upon this visceral and compelling concern for the
here-and-now. Childress distinguishes Max Weber's two measures of behavior, zweckrational ("goal-rational") and wertrational ("value-rational"), 77 in his defense of the rescue mission. "There is . . . an
' 78
important distinction between realizing a goal and expressing a value,"
and both, according to Childress, are important ends and substantial justifications. While sacrificing the immediate in favor of the future may be
a perfectly appropriate goal "'we have (rationally defensible) worries
about the sort of moral character represented by people who propose to
71. Green, supra note 69, at 194-96. For another approach to health care justice based
upon Raws' theory, see DANIELS, supra note 56, at 167-82.
72. See DANIELS, supra note 56, at 81.
73.

LUBAN, supra note 40, at 306-10.

74. Id. at 341-57, 368-69.
75. EDMUND PELLEGRINO & DAVID C. THOMASMA, THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF
MEDICAL PRACTICE 243 (1981), quoted in Robert M. Veatch, Justice in Health Care: The
Contributionof Edmund Pellegino, 15 J. MED. & PHIL. 269, 280 (1990).

76. Childress, supra note 66, at 142. The support for that statement appears rather
strong if governmental and institutional policies are explored.
77. Id. at 143 (quoting MAX WEBER, MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY
(Max Rheinstein ed., 1954)).
78. Id.
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stand pat and let present victims die for the sake of future possibilities.' ,,79 The symbolism and the values expressed by the sacrifice may be
unacceptable. In this connection, Childress quotes Charles Fried:
"[S]urely it is odd to symbolize our concern for human life by actually

doing less than we might to save

''
it. 8o

Childress and Fried do not need to persuade us that their position
on the question of rescue versus preventive medicine is correct to be relevant to the discussion of rebellious lawyering. It does seem that the urgency about which Fried and Childress worry is less dramatic in
lawyering. We are not, for the most part, talking about life and death
sacrifices when immediate conventional lawyering is deferred in favor of
mobilization. Moreover, the sacrifices I see in the rebellious stance are
less clearly present generation versus future generation, although this
matter is not fully clear. What I have described as the future oriented
approach of the rebellious stance can be seen as benefitting existing clients later, or benefitting other, as yet unnamed, future clients. How that
outcome is predicted will substantially affect the symbolism of sacrifice
81
that the above writers find so troubling.
Whatever one thinks about Childress' defense of the rescue medicine
preference, two important consequences follow for our purposes. The
first concerns the role of the client and of client choice in the resource
allocation scheme. If one rejects the "value-rational" defense, 82 either
because it applies less visibly to legal resource decisions or because one
finds it unpersuasive relative to the justice based theories favoring the
long view, one must acknowledge that allocation decisions favoring future gain can feasibly be made only by persons not subject to present
deprivation. If present recipients or applicants for scarce resources were
to "vote" on the question of present versus future application of those
resources, we could not reasonably expect the vote to be in favor of deference to the future.
I think this point is fairly self-evident, but one example from
bioethics might be helpful in understanding the difficulty inherent in devising a scheme that requires sacrifice by those subject to it. A slightly
different tension from the rescue/prevention dilemma in medicine is the
tricky issue of clinical trials. In medical research, a "randomized clinical
79. Id at 144 (quoting Lawrence Becker, The Neglect of Virtue, 85 ETHICS 110, 118
(1975)).
80.

CHARLES FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES: PROBLEMS OF PERSONAL AND SO-

CIAL CHOICE 217 (1970), quoted in Childress, supra note 66, at 144.
81. Childress, supra note 66, at 143, discusses these factors as relevant to the "value-

rational" inquiry of the conduct in question.
82.

See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
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trial" (RCT) is thought to be an important element in ascertaining the
efficacy of a given therapeutic procedure or medication. 83 The "randomized" character of the research means that studies are performed "blind,"
with certain subjects receiving the intended treatment while others are
offered a placebo or an alternative treatment.8 4 Though RCTs are intended generally to be employed among multiple treatments whose effectiveness is in question, 85 there is much evidence that clinicians believe
(and expect to prove by the experimentation) that one treatment is superior.8 6 The trials in many cases therefore call for some sacrifice from
patients in the interests of "science," which is another way of saying in
the interests of future patients.8 7 Ian Robinson captures the ethical tension in the following questions:
[I]s it possible to have a randomised controlled trial in which the obligations of the clinical scientist to the collectivity do not ethically undermine the obligations of the clinical healer to individual patients
participating in the trial? In brief, is it possible to reconcile the scientist's duty to all present and future patients with the healer's duty to
present patients? 8
RCTs remain morally troublesome because of this tension.8 9 Some
bioethicists have argued that patients need not be asked to consent to the
trials, claiming that those patients will benefit ultimately from the experimentation. They also assert that patients are apt not to consent to participation if nonrandomized treatment is available, and that absent their
consent the medical research will be impossible. 90 This view is not the
accepted one among medical ethicists, most of whom agree that RCTs
are justified only when conducted with the knowing consent of the af83. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 62, at 349-50; ROBERT J.LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 185-212 (2d ed. 1986); Ian Robinson, Clinical

Trialsand the Collective Ethic: The Case ofHyperbaricOxygen Therapy and the Treatment of
Multiple Sclerosis, in SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES ON MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 57, at
19.
84. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 62, at 350; LEVINE, supra note 83, at 185;
David P. Byar, Randomized Clinical Trials: Perspectives on Some Recent Ideas, in ETHICAL
ISSUES IN MODERN MEDICINE, supra note 59, at 441, 442.
85. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 62, at 351. Robert Levine refers to this as the
"null hypothesis," that "there is no scientifically validated reason to predict that Therapy A
will be superior to Therapy B." LEVINE, supra note 83, at 187.
86. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 62, at 351; LEVINE, supra note 83, at 187.
87. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 62, at 350.
88. Robinson, supra note 83, at 21.
89. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 62, at 350-51.
90. Michael Baum, Do We Need Informed Consent?, 1986 LANCET 911; DITCHLEY
FOUNDATION REPORT, THE SCIENTIFIC AND ETHICAL BASIS OF THE CLINICAL EVALUATION OF MEDICINES (1980), cited in Robinson, supra note 83, at 22.
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fected subjects. 91 Implicit in the literature, however, is the understanding that patients, while informed about the risks of RCTs, are not
necessarily offered the choice of full treatment or RCT participation; instead, the choice is between participating or not participating in the
RCT. 92 It is apparent that, except with an RCT that compares two
equally risky treatments, patients will opt, when allowed the choice, for
treatment rather than a placebo, or for conventional "healing" medicine
93
rather than scientific research medicine.
In similar fashion, we cannot expect clients, if offered a free and
informed choice, willingly to sacrifice their present benefits for future
benefits unless the promised benefits are substantially assured and will
accrue to those clients themselves. This does not deny the possibility of
altruism and self-sacrifice, at least on occasion; it does, however, suggest
that rebelliousness may need to be imposed from above. Before I discuss
the apparent difficulty with that conclusion, I will briefly address the second conclusion that the rescue mission/prevention debate evokes.
Recalling the "value-rational" concern for the symbolism of not aiding the dying, 94 we must confront the visceral strength of the emotional
response doctors have when asked to make social justice choices at the
bedside. While those responses may not require us to reject the long
view, they do cause us to pause before seeking to establish the long view
policy through street-level lawyers. There is much to be said for a
"moral division of labor," 95 in which the individuals who impose the
long view are not those who have to treat the individual client or patient.9 6 This would not mean a rejection of collective activity, mobiliza91. See eg., BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 62, at 96, 353; Loretta Kopelman,
Consentand Randomized Clinical Trials: Are There Moral or Design Problems?,11 J. MED. &
PHIL. 317, 320-21 (1986) (arguing for the applicability of informed consent to trials).
92. See, e.g., LEVINE, supra note 83, at 190-92 (describing how Veterans Administration
(VA) patients are common subjects of RCTs because their only alternative would be to pay for
private care outside the VA facility).
93. See id
94. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
95. See Veatch, supra note 75, at 274.
96. This division of labor also has been advocated in the medical context by Charles
Fried:
[Tihe conflict between the hospital administration seeking to impose a particular efficient or just system of health care and the physician seeking to acquire for a patient
the very best health care regardless of the system... develop[s] the best balancing of
forces needed to secure a health care system that is attentive to general goals of
efficiency and social justice, while at the same time having concern for the particular
interests of particular patients.
Charles Fried, Rights and Health Care-Beyond Equity and Efficiency, 293 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 241, 244 (1975); see also ENGLEHARDT, supra note 63, at 346-47; Eric J. Cassell, Do
Justice, Love Mercy: The Inappropriatenessof the Concept of Justice Applied to Bedside Deci-
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tion, or other aspects of the rebellious stance. It does mean, however,
that the choices about how to proceed with a community of clients would
need to be imposed upon street-level lawyers via some administrative or
similar authoritative structure to overcome the natural preference for the
97
here-and-now.
C. Some Reflections on the Fate of Rebellious Lawyering in the Context of
Street-Level Reality
One reasonable conclusion to be drawn from bioethical experience
with the prevention/rescue dilemma is that rebelliousness may need to be
imposed upon, rather than chosen by, individual lawyers and clients.
The "moral division of labor" 98 approach may be the best way to avoid
the preference for the here-and-now. The imposition of rebelliousness in
legal circles, however, may be much more difficult than the imposition of
a prevention ideology in medicine. Reimbursement schemes in medicine
have a powerful impact on the behavior of individual physicians, and
reimbursement mechanisms are almost uniformly imposed from without.
For example, in 1987 Oregon legislators amended the state Medicaid
program to cease covering organ transplants. The state concluded that
the funds saved by this change would provide regular prenatal care to
fifteen hundred pregnant women. 99 This simple example demonstrates
how macroallocation decisions can be made from above, thereby relieving the individual physician of having to justify to her patient the decision not to perform a transplant.
This kind of macroallocation mechanism is far less likely to occur
within poverty law contexts. For subordinated clients who must pay for
private counsel, insurance coverage for legal expenses is unlikely to be
available. The resource allocation decisions that must be made within
that context therefore will be negotiated directly between the attorney
and her client, without the third-party influences offered by an insurer.
For subsidized practice, macroallocation might occur at the level of the
funding source, such as the LSC. Putting aside, for the moment, the
sions, in

JUSTICE AND HEALTH CARE, supra note 56, at 75 (lamenting the lack of attention to
concepts of mercy and compassion in bioethics, and positing that emphasis on those values
would suggest greater care for the immediate patient by the physician).
97. Of course, the phenomenon of favoring immediate clients over long-term interests of
a larger community is not only reported in medical literature. The strong pull to assist each
needy client who seeks help from a poverty law office has also been noted in legal literature.
See, e.g., James F. Smurl, Eligibilityfor Legal Aid: Whom to Help When Unable to Help All,
12 IND. L. REv. 519, 530-31 (1979).
98. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
99. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 62, at 285-86.
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ferociously unsympathetic attitude of the current and recent administrations to anything closely resembling collective lawyering efforts for the
poor,oo even the most progressive federal administration is likely, at
best, to send regnant, not rebellious, messages to its field offices. 10 1
We cannot realistically hope that rebellious lawyering will be imposed by the government agencies that fund poverty law. This presents
serious consequences for the success of the endeavor. Advocates of the
rebellious view must develop incentives for lawyers to adhere to the long
view in spite of the visceral urge to respond to present crises. Individual
programs may have more flexibility and therefore might perform the
mesoallocation that removes some decisionmaking from the front
lines.10 2 Poverty law offices may also want to explore the prospect of
100. President Reagan, while he was in office, consistently advocated the elimination of
the LSC. Although he did not succeed in that endeavor, he was successful in reducing funding
for the agency by more than 25% in his first year in office. See Roger C. Cramton, Crisis in
Legal Services for the Poor, 26 VILL. L. REv. 521, 547 (1980-81) (discussing cuts proposed in
1981). Reagan also appointed persons to the LSC Board of Directors who believed that the
agency should be abolished. See Ken Englade, The LSC UnderSiege, 73 A.B.A. J. 66 (1987);
see also W. Clark Durant, Maximizing Access to Justice: A Challenge to the Legal Profession,
in THE LEGAL PROFESSION: RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION 435 (Geoffrey C. Hazard,

Jr. & Deborah L. Rhode eds., 2d ed. 1988) (speech by President of LSC in which he calls for
the abolition of the LSC, and its replacement by nonprofessionals). The most significant justification employed by the Administration for weakening the LSC was its perceived role in leftwing, political, and "social engineering" activity. See Durant, supra, at 435; Spiro T. Agnew,
What's Wrong with the Legal Services Program, 58 A.B.A. J. 930, 931 (1972) (complaints
addressed to LSC's predecessor, the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) program).
As a result of conservatives' distrust of the LSC's workings, Congress has amended the
LSC statute to incorporate several restrictions on the activities of LSC-funded lawyers and
programs. LSC fund recipients are prohibited by statute from engaging in, or assisting others
to engage in, public demonstrations, picketing, boycotts, or strikes while carrying out legal
assistance, and from participating in riots, civil disturbances, violations of injunctions, or
"other illegal activity" at any time. 42 U.S.C. § 2996e(b)(5) (1988). Attorneys also are prohibited from participating in class action activity without express approval from the director of
the legal services program. Id § 2996e(d). LSC funds also may not be used to: organize or
assist in the organization of any entity except one for the provision of legal assistance to eligible clients, 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b)(7) (1988); support or conduct training programs for the purpose of advocating particular public policies, id § 2996f(b)(6); or engage in activity concerning
abortion, school desegregation, or Selective Service Act violations, iad § 2996f(b)(8)-(10).
101. The OEO experience in the 1960s serves as a critical reminder of this conclusion.
Unlike the strict, antipopulist mandate of the Reagan LSC regime, the OEO created during the
Lyndon Johnson administration expressly encouraged community organization and collective
methods of service delivery by all of its agencies. See Cahn & Cahn, A Civilian Perspective,
supra note 3, at 1318; Cramton, supra note 100, at 524-25. Despite this laudable intent, the
actual implementation of the OEO's aspirations was far less radical and far more professionalized. See Cahn & Cahn, A Civilian Perspective,supra note 3, at 1318-29; Cahn & Cahn, The
Civilian Perspective Revisited, supra note 3, at 927-30. It also became clear that a politicized
model based on community organization would be very controversial, and would risk losing
the support of even a friendly administration. Cramton, supra note 100, at 524-25.
102. One fundamental practical obstacle to even this suggestion is the presence of restric-
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representing groups more often. Within groups the rescue mission is at
least diffused, and the long view may be more attainable.
Finally, the question of the role of the "client voice" ' 10 3 theme needs
to be addressed. The discussion above points out the need for some separation between the individual clients in need and the imposition of long
view lawyering. The client voice theme argues for much greater connection between those in need and the lawyer who responds to that need. To
the extent rebellious lawyering does not seek deferral of gain, such
greater connectedness would be nothing but a blessing.1°4 But to the
extent rebelliousness takes the long view, increased connectedness would
only make that view more difficult to sustain. The "value-rational" is apt
to conflict deeply with the "goal-rational" 10 5 and some means of resolving that tension will need to be devised.
Conclusion
Writers have been imploring poverty lawyers to pursue empowerment and collective mobilization for more than twenty years. 10 6 Yet rebelliousness remains the exception, and not the norm. In my opinion this
is not due to a lack of power or force in the argument for rebelliousness.
I have tried to show that psychological factors, most notably the visceral
attraction to the here-and-now, and institutional factors, including the
failure of existing programs to remove allocative decisionmaking from
street-level lawyers, account for the prominence of regnant ideology.
Unless and until progressive theorists can counteract the inherent rescue
preference in neighborhood legal services offices with something more
than exhortation, poverty lawyering will remain more or less
conservative.

tive LSC regulations that prohibit much of the collectivist lawyering that the rebellious stance
would suggest. See supra note 100 (describing restrictions on LSC lobbying, community organizing, and political activity). One possible avenue available to neighborhood offices might
be the use of unrestricted state funds made available through the increasing use of Interest on
Lawyer Trust Account (IOLTA) schemes to raise funds to offset LSC cutbacks.
103. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
104. For an example of the blessings of the increased understanding of, and attention to,
client voice, see, eg., White, Sunday Shoes, supra note 3. But see Tremblay, A Tragic View,
supra note 13 (manuscript at 19-24) (noting the risks involved in the message implicitly conveyed by Professor White in the Sunday Shoes story).
105. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
106. See, e.g., Wexler, supra note 3 (version of the rebellious view published in 1970).

